The Going Concern Trap: How Kenya’s Security Apparatus Profits from Permanent Crisis
The Going Concern Trap: The Hidden Business Logic Behind Kenya's Unstoppable Security Crisis
Most Kenyans will find it difficult to believe that the abduction unit (Subaru boys) has been a self-sustaining profit operation from day one. The truth is often much more stranger and bizarre than fiction.
In the corporate world, dissolving an active, operational company is a notoriously complex and frustratingly slow endeavor. Even when a business enterprise is bleeding cash, drowning in astronomical debts, facing public ruin, and destroying its brand reputation, it cannot simply vanish from the marketplace overnight. It must painstakingly navigate a tedious, legally binding liquidation process involving active labor contracts, outstanding financial liabilities, supply chain dependencies, and deep institutional obligations. Strangely enough, this exact economic principle explains why Kenya’s highly controversial state abduction units refuse to shut down, completely defying all conventional political logic and executive public relations strategies.
From an organizational and structural standpoint, a specialized, covert security team operates exactly like a corporate "going concern." Over time, it develops its own internal economy, specialized operational assets, distinct human resource structures, and unspoken institutional privileges. The individuals embedded deep within these shadow units are highly trained, heavily armed, and entirely reliant on the continued existence of the enterprise for their personal livelihoods, career trajectories, and families. You cannot simply turn off their funding, revoke their access keys, or hand them pink slips without triggering catastrophic collateral damage to the parent organization—which, in this case, is the ruling regime itself.
Disgruntled, suddenly unemployed, and desperate secret goon agents holding sensitive state secrets represent an existential threat to any government. Consequently, the current administration finds itself trapped in a classic operational bottleneck. Even if top political leadership fully realizes that these extrajudicial tactics are actively destroying the nation's global reputation, driving away foreign direct investment, they cannot easily wind up "the company." The unit cannot be neatly folded into a briefcase, tucked away out of sight, and forgotten. Instead, it functions as a highly volatile, toxic liability that must be continuously managed, funded, protected, and appeased.
To understand why this security enterprise remains active, one must examine the hidden balance sheet of its operations. The unit has accumulated significant "political debt." Over the course of its existence, it has carried out illegal directives, generated classified dossiers, and shielded specific political actors from accountability. In return, the operatives expect a continuous stream of compensation, immunity, and institutional protection. The moment the state attempts to liquidate this operational asset, the risk of a massive corporate leak increases exponentially. If these operatives feel abandoned by their political sponsors, their natural survival instinct will be to expose the entire corporate structure of the operation, detailing exactly who authorized the illegalities, who funded the safe houses, and who selected the targets.
Moreover, the infrastructure required to run a going concern of this nature involves an intricate network of logistical dependencies. Renting/purchasing unmarked vehicles, maintaining safe houses across urban centers, procuring specialized communication intercept tools, and managing discretionary cash flows require a dedicated administrative apparatus. Once these systems are integrated into the broader state machinery, they develop inertia. Bureaucrats and intermediate commanders become complicit, creating a thick layer of institutional self-preservation that actively resists cancellation orders from above.
This operational reality completely invalidates the public declarations made by government spokespersons who promise swift investigations and immediate endings to the security crisis around abductions and forced dissaperances. An administrative order cannot instantly dissolve a specialized squad that has been told for months that they are the ultimate line of defense for the state. The squad members view any attempt to scale back their operations not as a policy shift, but as a direct breach of contract by their political employers.
Ultimately, the administration is learning a bitter lesson in institutional economics: launching a rogue, extrajudicial state enterprise is significantly easier than managing its eventual liquidation. By allowing a shadow entity to achieve the status of a going concern, the state has effectively lost its executive override switch, transforming what was meant to be a temporary enforcement tool into a permanent, runaway operational expense that threatens to bankrupt the regime's remaining political capital.
Although many analysts firmly believe that Ruto does not have any remaining political capital to speak of.
MUST watch video to understand this more deeply below; How Ruto Subaru goons sent an SMS warning before abducting young Kenyan Amazon writer
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